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Abstract 
This study intends to provide an empirical answer to the question of whether 
Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules have affected growth of European Union countries. A 
growth equation augmented with fiscal variables and controlling for the period in which 
fiscal rules were implemented in Europe is estimated over a panel of 15 EU countries 
(and 8 OECD countries) for the period 1970-2005 with the purpose of answering this 
question. The equation is estimated using both a dynamic fixed effects estimator and a 
recently developed pooled mean group estimator. GMM estimators are also used in a 
robustness analysis. 
Empirical results show that growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not 
negatively affected in the period after Maastricht. This is the case when the recent 
performance of EU countries is compared both with their past performance and with the 
performance of other developed countries. Results even show that growth is slightly 
higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be 
officially assessed. Therefore, this study concludes that the institutional changes that 
occurred in Europe after 1992, especially the implementation of Maastricht and Stability 
and Growth Pact fiscal rules, should not be blamed for being harmful to growth in 
Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of Maastricht criteria and Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) fiscal 
rules on economic growth is an important issue that has generated a lively discussion 
among economists. This discussion has progressed much further in the theoretical field 
than in the empirical one. 
Arguments for fiscal rules have their foundations in the theory of Optimal 
Currency Areas, which states that when countries form an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) they lose their independence over both monetary policy and the exchange 
rate. Therefore, a significant centralization of the national budgets to accommodate 
asymmetric shocks in the different countries would be desirable or expected. However, 
in the European Union (EU) context this did not occur because of the fears that the 
resulting temporary fiscal transfers might become permanent, which could create 
political problems among the EU countries and endanger the unity of the EU. 
Therefore, the alternative was to leave the fiscal policy in the hands of national 
governments – to face asymmetric shocks when necessary – and to put in place rules to 
avoid excessive deficits. Those rules are important because governments’ temptation to 
create budget deficits to absorb negative shocks in an EMU can lead to problems of 
sustainability of those deficits and to growing government debts. There could also be 
negative spillovers for other EU states, and the price stability policy of the Central Bank 
could be undermined. For example, a country that allows its debt-GDP ratio to increase 
continuously can force the EU interest rate upwards, which will increase the burden of 
government debts in the other countries and force them to follow more restrictive fiscal 
polices to stabilize their debt-GDP ratios. This might also compel countries to pressure 
the European Central Bank (ECB) to relax its monetary stance, which could endanger 
the stability of prices in the Europe. 
These considerations led to the definition in the Maastricht Treaty of budgetary 
rules that countries have to satisfy in order to take part in EMU: the 3% of GDP deficit 
rule and the 60% of GDP debt rule. These same rules were later reinforced in the SGP 
for countries in EMU, in order to avoid the problems mentioned above. 
Some politicians and economists have recently argued that, despite the 
justification for fiscal rules in an EMU without a centralised budget, EU fiscal rules 
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may have undermined economic growth in Europe.1 Very few empirical contributions 
exist to sustain or refute such a suggestion. This study tries to contribute to the literature 
by evaluating empirically the impact of EU fiscal rules on economic growth in the 
framework of a simple growth model. The results presented in this paper do not support 
the contention that fiscal rules have damaged growth. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some 
motivation for the analysis of the impact of the EU fiscal rules on growth: Maastricht 
and SGP rules are described and EU economic performance is evaluated; an overview 
of the literature is presented and some ideas are advanced to fill its gaps. Section 3 
specifies the econometric model and the estimation techniques. Section 4 presents the 
data followed by the estimation of the model and discussion of the empirical results. 
Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion with the main findings of this paper. 
 
2. Motivation and literature on EU fiscal rules 
The aim of this section is to present an overview of the EU fiscal rules 
complemented with some data analysis and references from the literature that try to 
assess their implications for the recent EU economic performance. 
 
2.1. From the Maastricht Treaty to the Stability and Growth Pact 
The first great step toward the creation of an EMU in Europe was the signature 
of the Maastricht Treaty by the EU countries in 1991. With this step, EU countries 
promised to abide by some criteria in order to be accepted as members of the EMU. 
Those criteria were numerically very simple and clear. To take part in the EMU: (i) a 
country should have a government budget deficit and debt lower (or not higher) than 
3% of GDP and 60% of GDP, respectively; (ii) its inflation rate should be no more than 
1.5 percentage points above that of the three best performing member states; (iii) its 
nominal long-term interest rate should be no more than 2 percentage points above the 
average rate of the three best performing member states concerning inflation; (iv) and 
finally, its currency should stay stable in the normal bands of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) for at least 2 years without devaluations. Having committed to these 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Thirlwall (2000), Arestis et al. (2001), Warin (2005) and Wyplosz (2006), among 
others. 
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criteria, the EU countries lost some degree of control over monetary policy and some 
degree of flexibility at the economic policy level. 
By 1999, almost all countries had accomplished most of the criteria, with the 
exception of Greece which fulfilled none, and Sweden and the United Kingdom which 
did not have their currencies in the ERM, meaning that 12 of the 15 EU countries could 
take part in the EMU. Furthermore, Denmark and the United Kingdom decided not to 
take part, arguing that they were not prepared yet to lose their independence over 
monetary policy. Thus, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain were the first countries to take part 
in EMU, which was created in 1999. Greece joined in 2001. 
By taking part in EMU, these countries ceded control over exchange rate and 
monetary policies to the European Central Bank. The only policy remaining in the 
hands of EMU member states is fiscal policy, but even this is limited by the 
requirements of the SGP. The main objective of the SGP is to regulate fiscal policy after 
the introduction of the Euro in 1999, i.e. to prevent countries from relaxing their 
convergence efforts or their fiscal policy after they have taken part in EMU. Therefore, 
the SGP was supposed to guide national fiscal policies in the EMU and persuade 
countries to achieve balanced deficits in the medium-term, with the aim of producing 
greater budgetary flexibility when members suffer asymmetric shocks and fall into 
recession, without disturbing price stability. 
Basically, the SGP consists of two parts: a surveillance part and a dissuasive 
part.2 The surveillance part or the warning mechanism of the Pact intends to prevent 
countries from falling into excessive deficits. The Council of the Ministry of Finances 
(ECOFIN) examines national stability programmes and recommends adjustments if a 
country’s budget deviates from the medium-term objective. 
The dissuasive part is activated when surveillance is not efficient in avoiding 
excessive deficits. In the original version of the SGP an excessive deficit was defined as 
a deficit higher than 3% of GDP, unless it was considered exceptional, i.e. unless it 
resulted from an unexpected event (like a natural disaster) or from a severe economic 
slowdown. The latter was defined as an annual decline of GDP of at least 2%. In such a 
situation no excessive deficit procedure was activated. If the fall in real GDP was 
between 0.75% and 2% and the deficit was higher than 3%, the member state could 
                                                 
2 For more details on the working of these mechanisms see, for example, De Grauwe (2005). 
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present arguments to justify the excessive deficit and then the Council would decide 
whether the arguments were valid or not. However, when the decline in real GDP was 
less than 0.75% no exceptionality could be invoked. So, if a deficit was detected, the 
Council should issue a recommendation for the member state to correct it. If it was not 
corrected, sanctions could be imposed: the country in default would have to make a 
non-interest bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP plus 0.1% for each point of the deficit 
above 3% of GDP. The maximum amount of the deposit was set at 0.5% of GDP. If the 
excessive deficit was not corrected in two years it was turned into a fine; otherwise, it 
was returned to the country in question. 
However, in practice, this process presents some flaws. Because the fines can 
only be decided upon by a qualified majority of the Council of Ministers of Finance, the 
original SGP creates a situation in which the judges who have to decide about the 
sanctions are the same persons (countries) who could be adopting the defence position 
next time (De Grauwe, 2005). That was probably one of the main reasons why no 
sanctions were applied to France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Portugal when they 
broke the 3% rule several times in this decade. The Commission insisted that those 
countries should correct their excessive deficits even in the middle of a declining 
business cycle (2002-2003), but France and Germany, in order to avoid a deeper 
economic slowdown, preferred not to follow this recommendation. This undermined the 
SGP power, which boosted the discussion of its reform. 
A consensus on the reform of the SGP was achieved in March 2005 and some 
changes were introduced:3 (a) the medium-term objective now refers to the cyclically 
adjusted budgetary position of a country; (b) countries with low debt ratio (and a high 
growth potential) are allowed to maintain a deficit of 1% over the business cycle; the 
others have to maintain a balanced budget over the business cycle; (c) the 3% budget 
deficit ceiling is maintained for all countries and more importance is given to the 
reduction of the debt ratio to less than 60% of GDP; (d) it is now enough to have a 
negative growth rate or a “protracted period of very low growth relative to potential 
growth” for a country to be allowed to (temporarily) exceed the 3% limit; (e) countries 
are now able to invoke more special circumstances for exceeding the 3% ceiling; for 
example, investment programmes or pension reforms that increase the debt today while 
improving the future sustainability of government finances will be accepted as special 
                                                 
3 On the reform of the SGP, see Artis and Onorante (2006), Buti (2006) and Diebalek et al. (2006). 
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circumstances allowing for a temporary breach of the 3% rule; (f) the adjustment path to 
the medium-term objective is now defined in conformity with the business cycle: 
countries have to commit to reinforce consolidation when the economy is growing, but 
that effort can be reduced in phases of weak economic growth; (g) countries which 
exceed the 3% ceiling, but have low debt levels, will be allowed to stretch the 
adjustment over a longer period of time. 
With a large number of specificities contemplated in the reformed Pact, which 
means more flexibility but less simplicity and transparency, it is not surprising that it 
has also attracted great debate and criticism. 
It is evident that both the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP – in both its former and 
reformed versions – stick to the idea that fiscal policies in a Monetary Union (without a 
centralised budget) should be subjected to rules, even if those rules can be criticised. Of 
course, it is easier to criticise them when economic performance is not as expected. The 
next section analyses EU economic performance under those fiscal rules. 
 
2.2. Economic growth in the EU and in other OECD countries 
In this section the evolution of growth of real GDP in the EU countries is 
compared with growth in a group of industrial non-EU countries. Those countries are 
the following OECD countries: Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the USA. Figure 1 shows the evolution of growth of real 
GDP in both groups of countries and in its analysis particular attention will be given to 
the period after Maastricht. 
Looking first at the EU countries, we identify a higher synchronisation of 
countries’ economic cycles in the period after Maastricht. This evidence can be 
interpreted as the natural result of the efforts of integration towards the creation of an 
EMU in Europe. Besides countries presenting similar growth trends, it is even possible 
to identify a long lasting episode of sustainable economic growth in the post-Maastricht 
period: after the recession of 1993 countries grew at rates of around 2% to 4% until 
2001 (Ireland and Luxembourg reached even higher rates). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
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That episode of sustainable growth is followed by a slowdown in economic 
activity in almost all EU countries. As the economic slowdown of 2001-2003 is the first 
episode of low growth after important institutional changes that have occurred in 
Europe, economists wonder whether that prolonged period of low growth can be due to 
those changes. More specifically, as this period is characterized by the implementation 
of fiscal rules (the SGP rules for the deficit and debt), economists ask whether those 
rules are influencing overall economic performance in Europe. The aim of this paper is 
to answer this question, or more precisely, to identify what has been the real impact of 
the fiscal rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, and later reinforced by the SGP, on 
EU economic growth. 
Looking just at Figure 1 and comparing EU economic performance before and 
after the imposition of fiscal rules in Europe, we do not find a significant difference in 
economic growth in both periods.4 Furthermore, there is no substantial difference in 
growth rates even when we compare average growth in the EU with average growth in 
the other OECD countries for the period after Maastricht.5 However, as there are many 
countries involved in the analysis and non-EU countries present a mixed behaviour, we 
cannot simply rely in the analysis of these figures. It is necessary to proceed with a 
more sophisticated and accurate statistical analysis. That work will be done in the 
empirical part of this paper. 
 
2.3. Literature and its gaps 
In the literature we find several studies that try to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the EU fiscal rules. Some simply raise doubts about the rules themselves and the way 
                                                 
4 On average, the growth rate of real GDP is not substantially different in both periods. In fact, the results 
of the simple computation of the annual average growth across the 15 EU countries shows an average rate 
of about 2.9% for the period before Maastricht (1971-1991) and 2.7% for the period after Maastricht 
(1992-2005). However, the annual average growth in the period in which the fiscal rules started to be 
officially assessed (1997-2005) is slightly higher than in the period before: 3.0% in the period 1997-2005 
versus 2.5% in the period 1970-1996. 
5 The annual growth rate across the 8 OECD countries for the period 1992-2005 is, on average, 
approximately 2.8% (and it is 3.1% for the period 1971-1991). These averages are the same when we 
compare the pre- and post-97 periods. These values are not very different from the ones obtained for the 
EU countries in the same periods. In fact, a simple (unconditional) differences-in-differences estimation 
(controlling for fixed and time effects) revealed no significant differences in growth rates between the EU 
and OECD countries as a result of the imposition of the fiscal rules. The following equation was used in 
this analysis: yit=βdit +ηi + τt + εit, where yit is the growth rate of real GDP, dit is a variable that takes 
value 1 in the period in which EU countries are affected by the fiscal rules (either after 1992 or after 
1997) and 0 both in the other periods and for the unaffected countries (OECD countries), ηi and τt are the 
fixed and time effects, respectively, and εit is the error term. The estimated coefficient for d is 0.002 (t-
value = 0.55) when the threshold is 1992 and 0.004 (t-value = 1.28) when the threshold is 1997. 
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they were defined by the European authorities in the SGP. Others analyse, either 
theoretically or empirically, the impact of those rules on the conduct of fiscal policy by 
national governments (deficit and debt behaviour) and their impact on public investment 
and economic growth. 
 
A) EU fiscal rules and the behaviour of fiscal policy 
One group of studies analyses the response of fiscal policy to the business cycle. 
Their results seem to indicate that the improvement of budgetary balances in Europe 
was mainly the result of a good economic growth rather than active policy adjustments. 
Nevertheless, the effect of those adjustments on growth itself is not examined. 
Gali and Peroti (2003) and Annett (2006) evaluate to what extent the constraints 
associated with the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP have affected the way national 
governments have conducted fiscal policy. Their results show that fiscal policy has 
become more counter-cyclical (or less pro-cyclical) over time: before Maastricht it was 
pro-cyclical, but after Maastricht it is essentially a-cyclical (although Annett (2006) 
shows that it seems to have become pro-cyclical again during the SGP period). 
Marinheiro (2004) also confirms that EU fiscal rules have reinforced the counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy and that this result is even more evident during downswings. 
More recently, Artis and Onorante (2006) estimate a set of structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) models for each Eurozone country with the purpose of assessing 
the importance of a set of fiscal rules, in particular the SGP rules in its old and reformed 
versions. Their results suggest that fiscal policy had a limited smoothing effect on the 
cycle in the 1990s. They also state that the changes in the rules of the Pact are likely to 
have very little impact on fiscal policies and conclude that the extra margin to conduct 
fiscal policies is extremely limited resulting in a negligible effect on growth. 
 
B) EU fiscal rules and public investment 
The relation between EU fiscal policy rules and public investment is analysed in 
another group of papers. Unfortunately, these studies do not proceed to test the 
subsequent effect of public investment on EU economic growth. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) blame the SGP for putting no pressure on the 
reduction of current government spending and consider it important to exclude (net) 
public investment from the definition of the budget deficit. However, this rule for 
excluding public investment from the computation of the deficit may present some 
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problems like the possibility of “creative accounting”, risk of a growing debt and 
unequal treatment of expenditure on human and physical capital. According to 
Balassone and Franco (2000) the idea of creating such a ‘golden rule’ in the EU may not 
be the best option because it can conflict with the objective of a sound fiscal stance. 
Verde (2004) suggests a more consensual approach of (temporarily) excluding high 
quality – or growth promoting – public spending from the computation of the fiscal 
deficit during periods of economic slowdown. 
By applying an empirical analysis, Gali and Peroti (2003) seek to confirm 
whether Maastricht and SGP rules have a negative effect on investment. Their results 
show a mildly pro-cyclical behaviour of public investment both before and after 
Maastricht. However, they conclude that the observed decline in public investment as a 
percentage of GDP in the last decade among the EU countries is not due to the 
constraints of either the Maastricht or the SGP. Indeed the decline in public investment 
started well before Maastricht and other industrial countries have registered an even 
greater decline. Perée and Välilä (2005) and Välilä and Mehrotra (2005) came to a 
similar conclusion. They also show that the SGP deficit rule is not responsible for the 
observed decline in public investment in Europe. For that reason, they are sceptical 
about the exclusion of public investment from fiscal deficit targets. 
 
C) EU fiscal rules and economic growth 
Another group of authors emphasize the need to boost economic performance as 
a condition for improving a country’s budgetary position in the long run. According to 
this view, economic growth should receive precedence over a strict application of the 
fiscal rules. Von Hagen (2003) argues that countries should be encouraged to adopt 
more growth-friendly policies by restructuring their government tax and expenditure 
systems. He supports the idea that authorities should pay more attention to the role of 
economic growth in achieving sustainable public finances. Using simple graphical 
analysis he observes that an increase in public investment, primary spending cuts, and 
reduction of direct taxes have a positive impact on GDP growth, which provides a 
strong foundation for the subsequent sustainable reduction of the deficit and debt. 
Therefore, he blames the SGP for focusing excessively on annual deficits which keeps 
governments from adopting important fiscal reforms that might result in larger deficits 
initially but which would bring the desired positive growth effects in the future. 
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A detailed examination of the extent to which the quality of the consolidation 
efforts during the 1990s affected macroeconomic performance in the EU is provided by 
Fatás et al. (2003). Their evidence indicates that fiscal adjustments based on the 
reduction of primary expenditures (wages and transfers in particular) are more persistent 
and successful in terms of debt reduction and are less damaging to growth than revenue-
driven consolidations. They show that the growth rates remained persistently above the 
EU average after expenditure-driven consolidations, while the difference vanishes 
quickly after revenue-driven consolidations. Thus, they conclude that tax-driven 
consolidations have been less favourable to growth than expenditure-led consolidations. 
Few empirical studies have intended to demonstrate how economic behaviour in 
Europe has been affected by Maastricht and SGP rules. Furthermore, there are some 
methodological flaws in these works and the results are unsatisfactory or do not provide 
a clear answer. For example, Hein and Truger (2005) examine the effects of EMU 
monetary and fiscal policies on growth and on convergence across the Euro-area. They 
observe that, despite a significant convergence of nominal variables (interest rate, 
inflation rate, deficit/GDP, debt/GDP), there was no convergence in terms of GDP 
growth, labour productivity and unemployment rates. Using simple pooled least squares 
regressions for 11 EU countries (1981-2001) they show that EMU macroeconomic 
policy institutions (ECB policy stance and SGP rules) have restrictive effects on growth. 
More specifically, they show that an increase in interest rates and a reduction in the 
structural primary government deficit have a negative effect on growth. Therefore, they 
conclude that the years before and after the introduction of the euro were characterized 
by a restrictive policy mix that has not been conducive to aggregate growth or to real 
convergence. 
However, the work of Hein and Trugger (2005) presents some flaws that may 
undermine their results. First, the conclusion that EMU macroeconomic policy 
institutions have restrictive effects on growth seems too strong, in the sense that in their 
model they are analysing the whole period 1981-2001 without distinguishing the 
periods before and after the institutional cooperation has become stronger. They could, 
for example, use a dummy for the period after 1992 or proceed to a separate analysis for 
the periods before and after Maastricht. Second, they use an ad hoc model specification 
without taking into account the economic growth literature. Hence, their specification 
can be criticised for lack of important variables. Finally, they ignore the reciprocal 
causality between GDP growth and public deficit. 
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A more consistent analysis can be found in Savona and Viviani (2003) and 
Soukiazis and Castro (2005). Despite some flaws, their approaches are more in 
conformity with the growth theory. However, a more adequate specification could be 
used, including, for example, physical and human capital and short-term dynamics in 
the model, since both studies use annual data. 
Savona and Viviani (2003) perform econometric tests in a fixed effects panel 
data model for a group of 12 EU countries for the period 1987-2002 and find evidence 
of a negative effect of current public spending on output growth and a positive impact 
of public capital spending on growth. According to their results, they argue for the 
modification of the rules of the Pact: it should exempt public investment from its 
constraints, but the automatic checks on current public spending should be maintained. 
Like Hein and Truger (2005), Savona and Viviani (2003) do not analyse the pre 
and post Maastricht (or SGP) periods separately nor the direct impact of Maastricht 
criteria and SGP rules on growth. Soukiazis and Castro (2003, 2005) make that direct 
analysis by using panel data estimations for the 15 EU countries for the period 1980-
2001. They observe that the greater fiscal discipline after Maastricht was harmful to 
both growth of real output and convergence in per capita income in the EU. But the 
evidence behind this conclusion is not strong enough because, although they find a 
lower rate of convergence in per capita output after Maastricht, their dummy for the 
period after Maastricht is not statistically significant. Moreover, they do not proceed in 
separately estimating the effects of the components of the deficit (current spending, 
public investment, tax revenues) on growth and they do not include human capital in 
their regressions. The inclusion of those variables would make the analysis more 
interesting and more in line with recent economic growth theory. Finally, the reverse 
causality of the deficit on the output is not taken into account in their study. 
 
2.4. Aims and contributions of this study 
Using the existing literature as starting point, this study intends to provide a 
clear empirical answer to the question of whether the Maastricht and SGP fiscal rules 
have affected growth in Europe. The analysis of this issue will be based on the 
estimation of a growth equation augmented with fiscal and economic variables. 
This paper also tries to contribute to the literature with some improvements 
relative to the previous empirical works on the impact of EU institutional changes on 
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growth. First, in this study the econometric analysis of the economic phenomenon is 
built around a formal growth model, contrary to the existing approaches that rely on ad-
hoc growth specifications. 
Second, short-run dynamics of output are controlled for by using both short-run 
regressors in the growth equations for annual data and a five-year time spans analysis. 
These procedures are not used in the previous empirical studies in this area of research. 
Third, a recently developed estimator is implemented in this analysis: a pooled 
mean group estimator. In fact, as this estimator allows for heterogeneity not only on the 
intercepts but also on other coefficients, it has some advantages over a simple fixed 
effects estimator in the estimation of a growth equation using annual data. 
Fourth, a new time dummy for the period in which fiscal rules started to be 
officially assessed is now used, instead of just a dummy for the period after Maastricht. 
This new dummy seems to be more appropriate because it covers the period of effective 
enforcement of the fiscal rules. Additionally, an indicator to control for the constraints 
that result from the implementation of the fiscal rules is developed: the margin of 
manoeuvre indicator. 
Finally, this study goes even further in the analysis and provides an original 
comparison between the economic performances of the EU countries and a group of 
industrial non-EU countries for the period after Maastricht. 
 
3. Specification of the model 
A growth equation augmented with fiscal and economic variables will be used in 
the analysis of the impact of EU fiscal policy rules on economic growth. The aim of this 
section is to derive the growth equation to be estimated and to define the adequate 
econometric estimation techniques. 
 
3.1. Specification of the growth equation 
Following the works of Mankiw et al. (1992), Islam (1995) and Bassanini and 
Scarpetta (2001), a policy-augmented growth equation can be derived from a traditional 
constant-returns-to-scale growth model. The standard neo-classical growth model is 
derived from a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function of the type: 
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[ ] βαβα −−= 1)()()()()( tLtAtHtKtY               (1) 
where the level of output at time t (Y(t)) is a function of physical capital (K(t)), human 
capital (H(t)), labour (L(t)) and the level of technological and economic efficiency 
(A(t)). The partial elasticities of output with respect to physical and human capital are 
represented by α and β, respectively. Labour is assumed to grow at a rate n(t): 
)()()( tLtntL =& . 
Next, according to Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001), it is assumed that A(t) can be 
divided in its two components: economic efficiency (E(t)), which will depend on 
economic policy and institutions; and level of technological progress (T(t)), which is 
assumed to grow at a constant rate g: )()( tgTtT =&  Therefore, we have: 
∑++=+= j jj tXqqtTtEtTtA )(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln)(ln 0            (2) 
where Xj(t) is a vector of variables affecting economic efficiency. 
The remaining two time paths of the right hand-side variables of equation (1) are 
described as follows: 
)(])([)()()()()( 1 tkdtnthtktAtstk k +−= −− βαβα&          (3.1) 
)(])([)()()()()( 1 thdtnthtktAtsth h +−= −− βαβα&          (3.2) 
where, k=K/L, h=H/L, sk and sh are the investment rates in physical and human capital, 
respectively, and d denotes the constant depreciation rate of both types of capital. 
Under the assumption that α + β<1 (i.e. under the assumption of decreasing 
returns of physical and human capital), the system of time path equations can be solved 
to obtain the steady-state values of k and h.6 Thus, after taking logs, we get: 
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6 This system of equations includes equations (2), (3.1), (3.2) and the time paths for labour and 
technological progress. For more details on this derivation, see Mankiw et al. (1992) and Bassanini and 
Scarpetta (2001). 
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where * denotes steady-state values. Taking logs in the production function and 
substituting these two equations there, we obtain the expression for the steady-state path 
of output in intensive form: 
[ ]dgtnthtstAty k ++−−−+−+= )(ln1)(ln1)(ln1)(ln)(ln ** α
α
α
β
α
α          (5) 
The steady-state value of output per capita, y*, is represented as a function of the 
steady-state stock of human capital (h*) instead of a function of investment in human 
capital (sh) because: (i) data available to represent human capital (h) is the ‘stock’ of 
years of schooling of the (working-age) population from 25 to 64 years of age; and (ii) 
it can be shown that the unobserved h* is a function of actual human capital (h): 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡Δ+=
)(
)(ln)(ln)(ln *
tA
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Assuming that observed growth rates include out-of-steady-state dynamics, then 
a linear approximation of the transitional dynamics can be expressed as follows 
(Mankiw et al., 1992):7 
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where )(λφ  represents the convergence factor as a function of the speed of convergence 
to the steady-state (λ=(1-α-β)[n(t)+g+d], -1<λ<0). Adding short-term dynamics to 
equation (7) in order to capture the short-run components of the dependent variable, we 
obtain the basic functional form that is empirically estimated in this study: 
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7 This equation is obtained substituting equations (2) and (6) into (5) and proceeding to the subsequent 
linear approximation around the steady-state. 
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Using the estimated coefficients from this equation and comparing it with 
equation (7), we can obtain estimates of the steady-state coefficients and the parameters 
of the production function. The estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state ( λˆ ) 
can be derived from the estimated convergence parameter (φˆ ) as follows: 
)ˆ1ln(ˆ φλ −−= ; the time to cover half way to convergence (hwtc) can be computed as: 
)ˆ1ln(/)5.0ln( φ−=hwtc ; the estimated long-run effects or coefficients on the 
investment rate, human capital and population growth on output (or the estimate of the 
respective elasticities) are given by φˆ/ˆ1a , φˆ/ˆ2a  and φˆ/ˆ3a , respectively; a similar 
deduction can be done to get the long-run coefficients on the other variables: φˆ/ˆ 4+ja ; 
finally, an estimate of the share of physical and human capital in output (α and β) can be 
obtained, respectively, as follows: )ˆˆ/(ˆˆ 11 aa += φα  and )ˆˆ/(ˆˆ/)ˆ1(ˆˆ 122 aaa +=−= φφαβ . 
 
3.2. Econometric estimation techniques 
In this model the observed growth of GDP per capita is the result of 
technological progress, the convergence process to each individual-specific steady-state 
and the shifts in the steady-state that may arise from changes in policy, institutions, 
investment rates and changes in population growth rate (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). 
Annual data are used to estimate the growth equation – in line with the works by 
Cellini (1997) and Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) – instead of averages over time 
(twenty or five-year time spans) as in the works by Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam 
(1995). Data with annual frequency is preferred because large time spans can involve 
the loss of important information. Moreover, according to Cellini (1997), the use of 
annual data produces more plausible values for the elasticity of output to the exogenous 
variables than the estimates reported by lower frequency regressions. 
However, annual variations in output contain cyclical components. Thus, it is 
necessary to consider a specification that takes into account those short-run dynamics. A 
way of controlling for those business cycle fluctuations is by including first-differences 
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of the determinants of growth as short-run regressors in the equations.8 As a result, the 
general form of the growth equation can be written as an error correction model: 
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where ε symbolizes the error term and θs represents the long-run coefficients. As usual 
in growth literature, a value of 0.05 is assigned to the constant g+d.9 
The model will be estimated by using pooled cross-country time-series data for 
15 EU countries, controlling for country-specific effects. In some particular regressions 
8 additional industrial countries (OECD countries) will be included for comparative 
purposes. Equation (8) will be the basis for these estimations and then long-run 
coefficients (θs) will be obtained as indicated in Section 3.1. 
Fixed effects are preferred to random effects because the population of the 15 
EU countries is entirely represented in the sample for the period under analysis. Thus, 
according to Marinheiro (2004), in a case like this it makes no sense to use a random 
effects estimator. A similar argument can be used for the estimations with the 23 OECD 
countries. The use of fixed effects will allow controlling for and capturing the actual 
specific characteristics of each country in the sample. 
However, this may not be the most adequate method to employ in this analysis. 
The fixed effects estimator allows intercepts to differ across countries while the other 
coefficients are constrained to be the same. Indeed, there is no reason to assume that the 
speed of convergence to the steady-state should be the same across countries (Bassanini 
and Scarpeta (2001)). Although there are reasons to believe in common long-run 
coefficients across EU countries – given they have access to common technologies and 
have intense trade relations – short-run dynamics and the speed of convergence may not 
be the same across them. In order to control for that case a pooled mean group (PMG) 
estimator is employed in a second phase of this study. This estimator, developed by 
                                                 
8 Another way of controlling for those annual fluctuations on output is by using larger time spans. Despite 
the already mentioned loss of important information, a specification for a larger time span (five-year time 
spans) will be considered latter in this work with the aim of comparing results. 
9 For details see, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992) and Cellini (1997). 
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Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), allows the intercepts, speed of convergence, short run 
coefficients, and error variances to differ freely across groups, but imposes homogeneity 
on long long-run coefficients. Thus, with the PMG procedure, we are able to estimate 
directly the following error correction version of the growth equation:10 
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and the long-run homogeneity hypothesis permits the direct identification of the 
parameters that affect the steady-state path of output per capita ( iiss a φθ /,= ). 
This method requires a T large enough such that we can estimate the model for 
each group separately. Therefore, when the data allow, this method will be used and its 
results compared to the results obtained with the dynamic fixed effects estimator. 
 
4. Empirical work 
This section starts by describing the data and variables used in the estimation of 
the growth equation. Then, the empirical results obtained from both the dynamic fixed 
effects estimator and the pooled mean group estimator will be presented and analysed. 
In the final part of this section those results will be compared with the results from the 
estimation of a growth equation using data for five-year time intervals instead of annual 
intervals.11 
 
4.1. Data and description of the variables 
Annual data used to estimate the growth equation derived in the previous section 
were mainly collected from the OECD Statistical Compendium (2006) for 23 OECD 
countries over the period 1970-2005. Besides the 15 EU countries, Australia, Canada, 
                                                 
10 Note that both this equation and equation (9) rely on the assumption that regressors are cointegrated. 
11 All growth equations were estimated by using the statistical software STATA 9.0. 
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Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA are also included in 
the sample. These countries are included in the sample to permit a comparison of their 
economic performance with the performance of the EU countries in the period after 
Maastricht, i.e. to determine whether economic growth was significantly higher or 
lower in the EU than in other developed countries in the period in which fiscal rules 
were imposed in the EU. 
A detailed description of the variables used in this study and respective sources 
can be found in Table 1. The dependent variable is simply defined as the growth rate of 
real GDP per capita (Δlngdppc). 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Traditional economic growth literature considers that the rate of accumulation of 
physical capital, the accumulation of human capital and population growth are the most 
important factors in determining the level of real output per capita.12 Indeed, significant 
differences in the investment rate over time and across countries are seen as a source of 
cross-country differences in output per capita. Studies on growth also assume that 
labour force skills and experience can represent a form of capital: human capital 
(Mankiw et al., 1992). The variables used to collect the effects of the physical and 
human capital are the ratio of real private fixed capital formation to real GDP (lnpfcf) 
and the average number of years of schooling of the working-age population (lnhk), 
respectively. Population growth is another important variable to be considered in the 
growth equation. 
Like several other works on economic growth, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) 
verify that some macroeconomic issues must also be considered in a growth analysis, 
namely the impact of fiscal policy, the benefits of having low and stable inflation and 
the benefits of exploiting comparative advantages of trade. According to their analysis, 
fiscal policy can affect output and growth in the medium-term and over the business 
cycle. Those effects may come from the financing and composition of public 
expenditure. More than the overall deficit, it is the composition of public spending that 
is relevant for economic growth. Negative effects on growth arise when government 
relies more on direct (or distortionary) taxes and when its expenditure focuses on 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Islam 
(1995). 
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unproductive activities. Hence, the impact of fiscal policy should be evaluated by 
looking at the components of government revenue (direct and indirect taxes) and 
expenditure (consumption and public investment). 
Finally, a low and stable inflation can have a positive effect on the level of 
capital accumulation and consequently on growth because investment decisions are 
usually made with a long-run perspective. On the other hand, higher volatility in 
inflation brings uncertainty which discourages firms from investing in some interesting 
projects. Additionally, gains from trade and exposure to external competition must be 
also taken into account because of their potential positive effect on growth. 
Besides the traditional determinants of economic growth described above, some 
dummies or qualitative variables to control for the period in which fiscal rules were 
imposed in Europe are included in the growth equation. Particular attention is given to 
the results from those variables because they will allow us to get an answer to the 
question of whether EU fiscal rules have affected real economic growth in Europe and, 
if so, whether that impact has been positive or negative. 
A dummy variable, similar to the one used by Soukiazis and Castro (2005), was 
built to control for the period after Maastricht. This dummy is named d92eu and is equal 
to 1 when we are observing an EU country for the period 1992-2005, and 0 over the 
period 1970-1991. It will take value 0 over the entire period 1970-2005 for the other 
OECD countries. As an alternative, a second dummy is built and used for the period in 
which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit is to be officially assessed. This 
period started in 1997 with the assessment of the countries that would take part in 
EMU.13 This second dummy is called d97eu and assumes value 1 for EU countries in 
the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise. In practice, d97eu can be seen as a dummy that 
will account for the impact of the SGP rules since they really come into effect, i.e. since 
the 3% fiscal rule has to be really accomplished, otherwise sanctions can be imposed. 
To avoid the fact that these dummies might be collecting the effect of several 
other factors and not exclusively the effect of the EU fiscal and institutional changes, 
the other 8 non-EU countries will also be included in the sample to control for common 
macroeconomic effects. Both the EU and the non-EU countries are industrialised 
countries with similar characteristics, intense economic relations, access to common 
technologies and linked economic cycles, which means that they are more or less 
                                                 
13 Before 1997 countries had just to make efforts to converge; there was no particular sanction if 
convergence criteria were not accomplished in a particular year between 1992 and 1996. 
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similarly affected by economic shocks (like the recession after September 11th 2001, the 
effect of an increase in oil prices, the slowdown of the US economy, etc). The dummies 
will, in this case, capture and reflect with more accuracy the particular effect of the EU 
fiscal rules and not the effects of other specific factors that affected growth in both 
groups of countries. Assuming that those other effects will affect both groups in a 
similar way, the main differences will come from the specificities of the institutional 
changes in the EU economy, where the fiscal rules assume an important role. 
This analysis can be done either for the period after Maastricht (1992-2005) or 
just for the period in which rules were officially assessed (1997-2005). In this case, as 
dummies d92eu and d97eu take value 1 for EU countries and 0 for non-EU countries, 
they can be used as the indicator to compare the performance of both groups of 
countries in those periods. Therefore, these dummies are now controlling for specific 
effects on the EU economy in the period post-Maastricht. Considering that the fiscal 
rules established by the Maastricht Treaty and SGP are a very important specific 
characteristic of the EU economy during the period 1992-2005, this will mean that the 
coefficients on both dummies will allow us to conclude whether those rules have had a 
particular impact on the EU economic growth. This approach constitutes an original 
contribution to the analysis of the impact of the EU fiscal rules on growth. 
In sum, according to the alternatives mentioned above, we may have either a 
time comparison (panel of EU countries over the period 1970-2005) or a cross-country 
comparison (panel of EU and non-EU countries over the post-Maastricht period) of the 
impact of the EU institutional changes on economic growth (or even both). 
A third alternative is to estimate a regression for the 15 EU countries using an 
indicator for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy (mg_mnvr – see Table 1). The 
expectation is that the greater the margin of manoeuvre in this period, the stronger 
economic growth in the next period, because it is assumed that countries can use fiscal 
policy to boost the economy in “bad times”. As Maastricht and SGP rules reduce the 
margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy in most EU countries, this means that if the 
coefficient on this variable is significantly positive then it can be concluded that the 
impact of those rules on EU economic growth was negative. 
Regression results for growth equations taking into account those alternatives 
are provided in the next section. In practice, the growth equations to be empirically 
estimated are equal to equations (9) or (10) – depending on which estimator is used – 
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plus the term tid ,γ , where tid ,  represents one of those qualitative variables that control 
for the period in which EU fiscal rules were imposed in the EU (d92eu, d97eu or 
mg_mnvr). 
 
4.2. Regressions and interpretation of the main results 
Based on the theoretical approach and data presented above, this work will 
proceed with the empirical analysis to determine whether fiscal rules imposed in Europe 
in the period after Maastricht have had a significant effect on growth in the EU 
countries. First, we will present and analyse the results from the dynamic fixed effects 
(DFE) estimator and then the results from a pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. 
Additionally, some robustness checks and sensitivity analyses will be provided. 
However, before proceeding to the estimation of the error correction models, 
using either the DFE estimator or the PMG estimator, it is convenient to analyse 
whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1), i.e. whether they are stationary or not. Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999) show that the same algorithm can be used to compute the PMG 
estimators whether regressors are I(0) or I(1), but their asymptotic distributions are 
slightly different. If the regressors are not stationary but are I(1), then it is convenient 
that they are cointegrated. This would make the error term a stationary process for all 
countries. Therefore, the order of integration of the regressors is established in first 
place and then – if they are non-stationary or I(1) – cointegration tests are performed. 
Panel unit root tests for each variable are presented in Table 2. Statistics were 
obtained by applying Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test. This test assumes that 
all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis. Results provide evidence that 
most of the regressors can be considered non-stationary (or I(1)) at a significance level 
of 5%: only sdinfl and ln(n+g+d) seem to be clearly stationary; the other regressors are 
either non-stationary or borderline, so we proceed treating them as non-stationary. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Having concluded that series are essentially integrated of order 1, some 
cointegration tests were performed by using Pedroni (1999) tests. Pedroni’s panel tests 
for cointegration are also reported in Table 2. Results show that 4 of the 7 tests reject 
the null hypothesis of no-cointegration (panel υ, pp, ADF and group pp tests). Although 
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not all tests reject the null hypothesis, the majority do. This fact provides some evidence 
of cointegration among the variables, which permits us to proceed with the estimation 
of the growth model presented above using either a DFE estimator or a PMG estimator 
in the context of an error correction mechanism. 
 
I) Dynamic fixed effects panel data estimation 
The results from a dynamic panel data estimation controlling for fixed effects 
are presented in Table 3. The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation is controlled for by using robust standard errors. Economic policy 
variables are lagged one period in all estimations in order to better identify their long-
run impact on output and to account for the usual delays in reporting of economic data. 
The time trend was not included in these regressions to avoid the loss of more degrees 
of freedom, because, when included, it was never statistically significant. Columns 1, 2 
and 3 of Table 3 present results just for EU countries over the period 1972-2004. In the 
remaining estimations the non-EU countries are included with the intention of doing a 
comparative analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
Results for the traditional determinants of economic growth are as expected. The 
convergence coefficient is statistically significant in all of the regressions presented in 
Table 3. Estimations show that convergence in output per capita in the EU countries 
runs at an annual rate of about 3.5%, which means that each year an economy’s GDP 
covers about 3.5% of its distance from the steady state.14 This suggests that it takes 
about 19 years to reduce by half the differences in output per capita among EU 
countries.15 
The coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth have the 
expected signs and are highly significant in almost all specifications. Thus, an increase 
in private investment and years of schooling and a decrease in population growth have a 
                                                 
14 Although, rather low, this value is in accordance with some seminal empirical contributions to the 
growth literature. Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992), among others, 
show that countries converge to their steady-state level of output per capita at a slow rate of 
approximately 2% or 3% per year. 
15 This seems quite a long time, but in Table 4 it is possible to verify that for the period 1997-2004 that 
time was reduced to about 7 years (see column 6). This means that EU countries have been converging in 
real terms over the last years at a good pace. 
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positive impact on output per capita. It is important to notice that in this analysis more 
attention is given to the long-run coefficients because short-run dynamics are just used 
to control for cyclical fluctuations. 
As expected, government investment (lngvfcf) has a positive and significant 
impact on real output per capita while government final consumption expenditure 
(lngvcns) affects it negatively. These results support the view of EU authorities that cuts 
in current expenditures to control the deficit may have positive effects on output in the 
long-run, but they also enhance the relevance given by some authors to public 
investment (Savona and Viviani (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Verde 
(2004)). In fact, EU authorities should take into account not only the importance of 
controlling excessive deficits but also the benefits of ‘productive’ public investment in 
the definition and application of the fiscal rules to countries in the EMU. 
It was also expected that a shift from taxing factor incomes to taxing 
consumption would have positive growth effects. Nevertheless, this study does not 
identify those positive effects in the EU context. The long-run coefficient on the 
variable lngvtxr is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. 
The variability of inflation (sdinfl) has a negative impact on output per capita, 
which is in accord with the findings of Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). Inflation itself 
was also used as an alternative, but results were quite similar (they are not presented 
here). As inflation shows a high correlation with the convergence variable and human 
capital, the variability of inflation is used instead.16 The results also suggest significant 
gains from trade and exposure to external competition in the EU context. The sign of 
the coefficient on lnxmr means that the higher the proportion of exports over imports 
the higher the output per capita. 
However, the results of most interest in this analysis come from the dummy 
variables for the post-Maastricht period. In the first regression presented in Table 3, the 
dummy d92eu was used to control for the growth effects in the EU-15 in the period 
after Maastricht. The coefficient on this variable is not significant. A similar result was 
obtained by Soukiazis and Castro (2005) in their analysis of output per capita 
convergence. This result may indicate that the institutional changes that took place in 
Europe after Maastricht do not seem to be harmful to output growth. Indeed, when a 
                                                 
16 Theoretically, it makes more sense to use the variability of inflation than its level, because the 
variability of inflation affects much more the decisions of consumption and investment (and economic 
growth) in the medium and long-term than its level. 
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dummy just for the period in which the fiscal rules started to be assessed (d97eu) is 
considered, it is even possible to conclude that growth of real GDP per capita is 
significantly higher than before: results show that after 1997 growth of real GDP per 
capita is, on average, about 0.5 percentage points higher than before. Therefore, these 
results allow us to conclude that economic growth in the EU was not negatively affected 
by those rules, contrarily to what some authors argue.17 
The third regression includes the indicator for the margin of manoeuvre lagged 
one period, but results show an insignificant coefficient. One interesting conclusion can 
be retrieved from this result: the reduction of the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy 
in the period after Maastricht did not have the expected negative impact on growth, 
meaning once again that fiscal rules were not as harmful to growth of real GDP per 
capita as one might imagine. This variable was also included in the other regressions 
presented here instead of the dummies, but it remained insignificant (results not 
reported here).18 
Next, other OECD developed countries were included in the sample for the 
period 1972-2004. Column 4 of Table 3 presents the results for the whole period. The 
dummy d97eu remains significant. In this case, that means that growth of GDP per 
capita in EU was not only higher than before 1997 but, at the same time, higher than in 
the other non-EU countries.19 To separate the temporal effect from the cross-country 
effects, estimations were performed just for the period after Maastricht. In column 5, the 
results for the period after 1992 are reported. In this case, the dummy d92eu is directly 
comparing the difference in growth between EU countries and non-EU countries. 
Results for the dummy do not show a significant difference in growth of GDP per 
capita: the estimated coefficient on the dummy is positive but insignificant. However, 
when we consider just the period after 1997, and d97eu is included instead, it is possible 
to observe significantly higher growth in the group of the EU countries than in the 
                                                 
17 If the coefficients associated to those dummies were significantly negative, it would not be clear 
whether the low economic growth was essentially caused by the fiscal constraints or by other factors. But 
as the coefficient on d97eu is significantly positive and d92eu is not significant, we have evidence to say 
that growth was not lower in the period in which fiscal rules were imposed in Europe than before. In 
reality, evidence shows a higher growth after 1997 (on average), but this is also not enough to say that 
that fact was a direct outcome of the fiscal rules, because other factors can be involved. 
18 This variable was also included as regressor in a simple government investment equation, similar to the 
one used by Perée and Välilä (2005), to test if it might affect growth indirectly via a potential effect on 
public investment. Nevertheless, even in that case, the coefficient on this variable was not significant. 
19 In the unconditional differences-in-differences estimation no significant differences were found 
between EU and non-EU countries’ growth rates (although the estimated coefficient on the dummy was 
positive), but when control variables are included in the equation, results show a significantly higher 
growth in the EU countries than in the OECD countries in the period after 1997. 
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others. In this case, a random effects estimator was used because the dummy d97eu was 
dropped in the fixed effects estimation due to lack of variability. In order to overcome 
that problem, an estimation for the period 1992-2004 was performed (column 7) using 
the dummy d97eu. The significance of the coefficients improves and the dummy 
remains highly significant. In fact, it is strengthening the idea that growth in the EU 
countries in the period after 1997 was not negatively affected by the fiscal rules. Indeed, 
if we gather the results of columns 6 and 7, there is evidence that growth was not lower 
in the EU than in the other non-EU countries. 
 
II) Pooled mean group panel data estimation 
Results of the PMG estimations and some robustness analyses are presented in 
Table 4. Only long-run and dummy coefficients are reported, but all equations were 
estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant. In the first 3 columns of Table 4 
we have the results of the PMG estimations for the EU countries over the period 1972-
2004.20 The results of some robustness checks are shown in the remaining part of the 
table. 
In the fixed effects estimations it was considered that intercepts could differ 
across groups but the other coefficients were constrained to be the same. Although the 
fact that the EU countries have access to common technologies and intense economic 
relations may justify the presence of common long-run coefficients, the speed of 
convergence to the steady-state and the short-run dynamics may not be the same across 
countries. Indeed, each country can follow a different path to the steady-state. 
Therefore, the PMG estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) seems to 
be a suitable instrument to control for these specificities. 
This method improves the significance of most estimates and generates a higher 
convergence coefficient. These results are a consequence of the improvements made on 
the assumptions of the model and are in line with the examples presented by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (1999). Now results suggest that it takes about 10 years to reduce by 
half the differences in output per capita among EU countries. Indeed, this result seems 
to be more adequate for industrial countries that have been increasing their efforts of 
integration over the last decades. 
 
                                                 
20 The author wishes to thank Ed Blackburne for providing the STATA code to perform the PMG 
estimations. 
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[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Estimated coefficients on physical and human capital and population growth 
have the expected signs and remain highly significant. Evidence on fiscal variables is 
also consistent with the previous findings: there is evidence favouring both the positive 
impact of public investment and the negative effect of public consumption on GDP per 
capita; and, once again, the positive effect of shifting taxes from factor incomes to 
consumption is not evident in the data. Finally, results confirm the negative impact of 
inflation on output and the expected gains from trade. 
The most important findings are provided by the time dummies and by the 
margin of manoeuvre indicator. The coefficient on the dummy for the period after 
Maastricht remains insignificant. Considering the dummy for the period in which the 
fiscal rules started to be officially assessed (d97eu), we get evidence that supports the 
previous finding that real growth of GDP per capita was slightly higher during that 
period than before. In this case, results show that after 1997 growth of real GDP per 
capita is, on average, about 0.9 percentage points higher than before. Finally, when the 
indicator for the margin of manoeuvre is included instead of the dummies, results 
confirm the insignificance of its coefficient. 
Thus, evidence from the fixed effects estimator is now corroborated by the PMG 
estimator or, more precisely, results from the PMG estimations reinforce the conclusion 
that in the period in which fiscal rules were implemented in Europe economic growth 
was not negatively affected by them, contrarily to what some authors claim. 
Results of a robustness analysis are presented in columns 4 to 7 of Table 4.21 
Those robustness checks are performed with the purpose of confirming if the results 
obtained so far are statistically solid. Column 4 presents results of an identical 
specification to columns 6 of Table 3, but using a different estimation method, which is 
more adequate to cases like this where the number of time periods is substantially 
smaller than the number of individuals (T small, N large). This specification is based on 
the application of Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. In this case, the 
                                                 
21 The intention was to proceed with a comparison of economic performances of the EU and non-EU 
countries using the PMG estimator, but PMG estimation becomes impossible in these cases because of 
the lack of variability of the dummy variables when the model is being estimated for each country 
separately before retrieving the PMG estimates. Moreover, PMG estimator requires a T large enough such 
that the model can be estimated for each country individually. This means that it is not viable to proceed 
with a comparative analysis of our model for the periods before and after Maastricht either. Due to the 
very low number of degrees of freedom it is not possible to get estimates for the convergence coefficient 
for some countries in the sample. Therefore, in this case, a fixed effects estimator is used. 
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regression equation is written in the form of a dynamic model using lngdppc as 
dependent variable and subsequently transformed for reasons of comparability with the 
other equations. Time-invariant country specific effects are removed by taking first-
differences in the estimation. Then the right-hand-side variables in the first-differenced 
equation are instrumented.22 This method improves the statistical significance of the 
results and allows us to conclude that after 1997 growth of GDP per capita in the EU 
countries is, on average, higher than growth in other industrial OECD countries; when 
the threshold is 1992 no significant differences are found (in this case only the results 
for the convergence coefficient and the dummy are reported). 
In columns 5 and 6, the economic performance of the EU countries before and 
after 1997 is compared (the same is done for the periods before and after 1992, but only 
the convergence coefficient is reported). Instead of using dummies, a separate 
regression for each period is estimated. The focus of this analysis will be in comparing 
the convergence coefficient of each regression. The convergence coefficient for the 
period before 1997 is considerably lower (in absolute value) than the one for the period 
after 1997, meaning that the speed of convergence to the steady-state is higher in the 
period in which fiscal rules are officially enforced than before. This evidence confirms 
the result given by d97eu above. When the pre and post Maastricht periods are 
compared separately no substantial differences are found, confirming once again the 
results obtained before for the case where d92eu was used. 
The last column reports estimates to compare the performance of the non-EU 
countries (column 7) with the performance of the EU countries (column 6) in the period 
after 1997 (and 1992). Despite the problems of significance due to the low number of 
observations in the regression for non-EU countries, results show that the speed of 
convergence in the EU countries is not substantially different from the other OECD 
countries, whichever period is considered. This reinforces the idea that EU fiscal rules 
may have not indeed affected economic growth in Europe. 
Thus, from this simple analysis it is possible to conclude that output growth was 
not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht in the EU. Therefore, Maastricht 
and SGP fiscal rules for the deficit and debt should not be blamed for being harmful to 
growth of real GDP per capita in the EU countries. On the contrary, evidence shows 
that, on average, growth is statistically higher in the period in which the fulfilment of 
                                                 
22 In the regression of column 4, the log of real GDP per capita is instrumented with its second and 
subsequent lags and the other variables are instrumented with their own values. 
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the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed… And this is true either 
comparing with the past performance of the EU countries or even with the performance 
of other developed countries. 
 
III) Sensitivity analysis 
In addition to the robustness checks presented above, other estimations were 
performed to verify whether the main results are sensitive to the exclusion or inclusion 
of some variables in the model. Some of the results of that sensitivity analysis are 
reported in Table 5 and Table 6. Those results were obtained by using a PMG estimator 
and regressions were performed including either a dummy for the period after 
Maastricht (d92eu) or for the period in which fiscal rules are officially assessed (d97eu). 
As the variable used to control for the revenue side of the government budget 
(lngvtxr) was never statistically significant, a new variable was included in the model: 
the log of the total government tax and non-tax receipts divided by GDP (lngvrcp). 
Nevertheless, it is also insignificant and the main results are not affected (see Table 5, 
column 1). The same happened when a similar variable considering just tax revenues 
was included as an alternative (results not reported). 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Despite the justifications advanced before to use the volatility of inflation 
instead of its level, the results of a regression including the level of inflation (infl) are 
reported in column 2 of Table 5. They show a significant negative effect of a higher 
level of inflation, but its inclusion in the model does not change the main conclusions of 
this study. Those conclusions remain valid even when both lngvtxr and sdinfl are 
excluded from the model (column 3), or when a simple growth specification à la 
Mankiw et al. (1992) is considered (column 4). 
Some other variables were included in the model to control for the omission of 
other potential factors that might affect output, like the OECD crude oil import price 
(lnoilp), the average growth in the OECD countries (gwgdp) and the deviation from the 
Taylor rule (devtr).23 Empirical evidence shows that oil price has a negative impact on 
                                                 
23 The deviation from the Taylor rule was computed as follows: devtr = short-term interest rate - Taylor 
rule, where Taylor rule = inflation + 0.5*output gap + 0.5*(inflation - 2) + 2. See Taylor (1993). This 
variable is included in the model to, somehow, control for the effects of the conduct of monetary policy. 
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output per capita, whilst a better economic environment in the group of OECD countries 
has a positive spillover affect on convergence in output per capita in the EU. 
Additionally, the output is negatively affected when the short-term interest rate exceeds 
the Taylor rule, but this effect is not always statistically significant. Nevertheless, the 
most important point to emphasize here is the fact that the other results are not 
substantially affected by the inclusion of those control variables. 
Theoretically, we would expect that a higher level of public debt had a negative 
impact on output (Saint-Paul, 1992). Estimations presented in column 1 of Table 5 and 
column 1 of Table 6 show that, in the case of the EU countries, it is not the level of the 
debt (debt) but the accumulation of more and more debt (Δdebt) that has a negative 
impact on output per capita. This evidence supports the concern of the EU authorities in 
avoiding growing debts and, somehow, justifies the rule for the public debt. 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Results also support the rule for the deficit. When the government budget 
surplus (gbs) is included instead of the other fiscal variables (column 2), we observe 
that output decreases as the deficit increases. However, the results of this estimation can 
be criticised due to a bias coming from the reciprocal causality between the government 
budget surplus and the dependent variable. A way of attenuating that problem and, at 
the same time, taking into account the rule for the deficit in the model more directly is 
to include a dummy that takes value 1 when the deficit is lower than 3% of GDP 
(def_rule). The lag of this variable is included in the regression presented in column 3 
of Table 6. Results show that when countries have deficits lower than 3% of GDP, they 
present a higher growth of real GDP per capita, on average. This result can be 
interpreted as some evidence in favour of the EU rule for the deficit. 
Thus, as the significance of the other variables, especially the dummies, is not 
affected by the inclusion of those fiscal variables, we have evidence to reinforce the 
idea that fiscal rules were not harmful to growth in the EU; furthermore, evidence is 
even supporting those rules. 
The margin of manoeuvre was also included in all the specifications reported 
before instead of the dummies, but it remained insignificant (results are not reported 
here). Some attempts were made to improve this indicator. In a first attempt, the values 
for the deficit (or GBS) were estimated from a rolling regression of the GBS on the time 
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trend to control for the time effects on the deficit and to make the deficit endogenously 
determined. Then the margin of manoeuvre was computed as the linear relation 
indicated in Table 1. However, when included in the growth specification, the 
coefficient associated with this variable is not significant (see column 4 of Table 6). 
This variable remains insignificant even when estimated directly from a rolling 
regression of the (original) marginal of manoeuvre variable on the time trend. In another 
attempt, the following non-linear relation was considered in the computation of the 
margin of manoeuvre: mg_mnvr is equal to the exponential of GBS if GBS<0 and 
year>1991; and equal to 1, otherwise. This indicator allows some (little) margin of 
manoeuvre even when the deficit is higher than 3% of GDP. The idea is to capture the 
implicit margin of manoeuvre that the countries that broke the rule in this decade seem 
to have enjoyed without being sanctioned. But, once again, no effect on output comes 
from this variable (see column 5). The same happened when the square of the (original) 
margin of manoeuvre was used and when a different relation was considered to compute 
this variable for large and small countries in the period after Maastricht (results are not 
reported here).24 Thus, this evidence seems to give more support to the argument that 
the reduction of the margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy in some countries in the 
period after Maastricht did not have a negative impact on growth of real GDP per 
capita. 
Another interesting aspect to clarify is whether growth in the group of countries 
that have had problems in accomplishing the 3% rule for the deficit (France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK) was indeed affected in the periods after Maastricht and 
after 1997. Results presented in column 6 confirm the findings obtained with the panel 
of all EU countries: growth of GDP per capita is not significantly different in the 
periods before and after Maastricht but it is higher, on average, in the period after 1997. 
The same happens when we consider a regression with the other 8 EU countries that 
have been accomplishing the rule (see column 7).25 One interesting finding comes from 
the results for the fiscal variables: cuts in government spending have a positive and 
significant effect on growth of GDP per capita in the group of countries that have had 
                                                 
24 A relation that allows a larger margin of manoeuvre for large countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
UK) than for the others was considered in this last case. 
25 This can mean that the first group of countries did not take advantage of the ‘good years’ after 1997 to 
stabilize their public accounts in order to have enough budgetary margin of manoeuvre to avoid breaking 
the rule in the ‘bad years’. This does not seem to be the case in the other 8 EU countries that have been 
accomplishing the rule. They also present a higher growth after 1997, but they seem to have taken 
advantage of it to stabilize their accounts. 
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problems in accomplishing the 3% rule for the deficit. These cuts are important because 
they promote not only a higher growth but also the necessary reduction of their deficits 
(directly, via the cuts, and indirectly, via a higher growth). Hence, this group of 
countries should promote measures to reduce their public spending. On contrary, in the 
group of countries that has achieved a stable budgetary position, it is not the spending 
cuts but the government investment that has a significant impact on growth. 
A final analysis assesses whether growth was higher in the non-EU countries 
after 1997, like it was in the EU countries. If so, the higher growth in the EU in the 
period in which fiscal rules started to be officially assessed can be due to international 
spillovers that may help to cover eventual negative effects of the rules. Nevertheless, 
results show that, on average, growth was not significantly higher in the other OECD 
countries after 1997 (or even after 1992 – see column 8).26 Therefore, this gives more 
support to the idea advanced in this study that EU economic growth was not negatively 
affected by the fiscal rules. 
Other regressions were performed including some political and institutional 
variables, like the timing of elections, ideological orientation of the government and 
constraints on the executive or on the political power, and even including variables 
controlling for the iteration of the exogenous variables with the dummies. However, the 
coefficients associated with those variables were not significant in any of the 
experiments, providing no additional explanation for the understanding of the behaviour 
of economic growth in the EU. Moreover, the results of this study were not significantly 
affected by the inclusion of those variables. The results and conclusions of this work are 
also robust to the exclusion of one EU country at a time from the sample and to the 
exclusion of the 3 EU countries that did not take part in the EMU (Denmark, Sweden 
and UK).27 
In sum, the main conclusions of this paper remain valid even when some 
variables are excluded from or included in the model: growth was not negatively 
affected in the period after Maastricht; and in the period in which fiscal rules are 
officially assessed we have (on average) a higher growth of GDP per capita in the EU. 
Additionally, the results of the sensitivity analysis for the fiscal variables give support 
                                                 
26 In this case, we consider just a basic specification of the model to avoid the loss of more degrees of 
freedom, once we consider just a small sample of countries in this PMG estimation. In reality, the PMG 
estimator does not converge and cannot retrieve the estimates when the other variables are included. The 
same problem affected regressions 6 and 7, but it was solved excluding just lngvtxr. 
27 These results are not presented  here, but they are available upon request. 
 32
to the rules for the deficit and debt and call attention to the importance of government 
spending cuts in the group of countries that have failed in accomplishing the fiscal rule 
for the deficit. 
 
4.3. Estimations using five-year time intervals 
In the empirical work done so far, annual data has been used to estimate the 
growth equation. Yearly time spans are used to avoid the loss of important information 
that might result from the use of larger time spans. The justification for the choice of 
annual data becomes more evident when economic performance of the EU and non-EU 
countries is compared and when a separate comparative analysis for the periods before 
and after Maastricht (or SGP) is made. Nevertheless, this choice implied the inclusion 
of short-run dynamics in the equation to control for cyclical fluctuations of output. 
Another way of avoiding the problem of the short-run business cycle 
fluctuations of output is precisely by using data from larger time intervals. Therefore, 
despite the mentioned loss of information that may result from the use of these larger 
time spans, we will proceed with the estimation of some growth equations using data 
from five-year time intervals in line with the works by Islam (1995), Caselli et al. 
(1996), Bond et al. (2001) and Ederveen et al. (2006). The objective of this final 
analysis is basically to evaluate the robustness of the results to a change in the time 
spans and assess whether the main conclusions are affected or not by that change. 
As a result of the use of five-year time intervals, the general form of the growth 
equation can simply be written as: 
tititititititiiti dxnhskyy ,,,,3,2,11,,0, ')05.0ln(lnlnlnln εγδβββφα ++++++++=Δ −   (11) 
for Ni ,...,1=  and Tt ,...,2= , where tiy ,lnΔ  is the log difference in output per capita 
over a five-year period, 1,ln −tiy  is the logarithm of output per capita at the start of that 
period and tix ,  is a vector of additional variables to be included in the basic growth 
equation. These variables and the other explanatory variables (lnsk, lnh, ln(n+0.05)) are 
measured as the average over each five-year period. A dummy or qualitative variable 
( tid , ) is added to the equation to control for the period in which EU fiscal rules were 
imposed in the EU, similarly to the case in which annual data is used instead. 
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Considering the same data and time period used in the annual analysis (1970-
2005), 7 five-year time spans are constructed for the 15 EU countries. These data are 
then used in the estimation of equation (11). Different estimators have been used in the 
literature to estimate this kind of dynamic panel data model. In this analysis, fixed 
effects (FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators will be employed. 
Fixed effects are widely employed in several growth studies. However, Caselli et 
al. (1996) argue that this estimator may lead to inconsistent estimates in the context of a 
dynamic panel data model because it does not take into account the fact that some of the 
explanatory variables can be endogenous and measured with error. Additionally, the 
incorrect treatment of country-specific effects may lead to omitted variable bias. A way 
of addressing this problem is using a first-differenced GMM estimator (DIF-GMM). 
This estimator was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and introduced in the 
growth literature by Caselli et al. (1996). The idea is to take first-differences of the 
regression equation, written in the form of a dynamic model, to remove unobservable 
time-invariant country-specific effects. Then the right-hand-side variables in the first-
differenced equation can be instrumented. This procedure will solve the problem of 
omitted variable bias that is constant over time; parameters are estimated consistently 
despite the endogeneity of right-hand-side variables; and the use of instruments allows 
for consistent estimation even in the presence of measurement errors. 
However, Bond et al. (2001) show that this method may present a serious 
problem when the empirical growth models are based on five-year averages to avoid the 
high persistence of the output series. This procedure reduces the number of time periods 
considered in the analysis to a small number and the first-differenced GMM estimator 
has been found to have poor finite sample properties, in terms of bias and imprecision. 
In fact, under these conditions, lagged levels of the variables are only weak instruments 
for the first-differences (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). Therefore, the results of this 
estimator must be analysed with caution. 
A refinement to this estimator that tries to solve the problem of the small sample 
bias was developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and then introduced in the growth 
literature by Bond et al. (2001). These authors demonstrate that more reliable results 
can be obtained by using a system GMM estimator (SYS-GMM). The idea is to 
estimate a system of equations for both first-differences and levels, where the additional 
instruments used in the levels equations are lagged first-differences of the series. Since 
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Bond et al. (2001) consider that this estimator may have superior finite sample 
properties, they recommend the system GMM estimator for empirical growth research. 
The results of the estimation of the growth equation using these estimators for 
five-year time spans are reported in Table 7. Growth regressions were essentially 
estimated including the same variables used in the annual analysis and incorporating a 
dummy either for the period after Maastricht or for the period in which fiscal rules 
started to be assessed.28 The indicator for the margin of manoeuvre (mg_mnvr) was also 
included in some regressions. 
 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
The estimates presented in column 1 and 2 were obtained by using a FE 
estimator. The convergence coefficient has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant in any of the estimations (including d91eu, d96eu or mg_mnvr), showing that 
convergence in output per capita runs at an annual rate of about 8%.29 The coefficients 
on physical and human capital and population growth have the expected signs, 
according to the growth literature, and are significant. The additional variables do not 
present robust results: only the government consumption (lngvcns) and the log of the 
ratio of exports over imports (lnxmr) have the expected signs and are significant; a shift 
from taxing factor incomes to taxing consumption has a negative effect on output, 
contrarily to the expected; and the other variables are not significant. Moreover, neither 
of the dummies nor the margin of manoeuvre are significant, which can be interpreted 
as an additional empirical support to the idea advanced in this study that institutional 
changes that took place in Europe after Maastricht were not harmful to growth. 
However, as the fixed effects estimator may lead to inconsistent estimates in the 
context of empirical growth models by the reasons indicated before, results from GMM 
estimators are reported in columns 3 to 6. The instruments used for DIF-GMM are the 
second and third lags of the log of output per capita. All other right-hand-side variables 
are assumed exogenous and are instrumented with just their own values in order to 
avoid the problem of too many instruments. The additional instrument used in the SYS-
                                                 
28 As we are considering five-year time intervals it is not possible to use dummies covering exactly those 
periods. The best we can do is to use a dummy that takes value 1 from the time interval 1991-1995 
onwards (d91eu) and a dummy that takes value 1 in the intervals starting in 1996 and 2001 (d96eu). 
29 This value is not very far from the one obtained by Islam (1995) using a fixed effects estimator in a 
basic growth equation over a panel of 22 OECD countries. 
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GMM is the difference of the log of output per capita lagged one period.30 Moreover, 
the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions does not rejects the overall validity of 
those instruments. 
Results for the DIF-GMM estimator show a higher rate of convergence of output 
per capita to its steady-state, but the physical capital variable is no longer significant 
and government investment has a coefficient contrary to the expected. As the sample 
contains just a small number of time periods, this might be the result of the finite sample 
bias and imprecision of this estimator. In order to avoid that problem, we also report the 
results from a system-GMM estimator (SYS-GMM) that seems to produce more reliable 
results in this kind of studies. 
The SYS-GMM estimator reports a lower estimate for the speed of convergence 
than the DIF-GMM, but not very far from the one obtained by using a FE estimator.31 In 
fact, the majority of the coefficients are not very different from the ones obtained by 
fixed effects. The main difference comes from the dummy for the period in which fiscal 
rules are officially assessed. In this case, we find evidence of a higher growth rate in 
that period than before. Results show that in the period after 1996 annual growth of real 
GDP per capita is, on average, about 0.86 percentage points higher than in the period 
before.32 In addition, no significant differences in growth are found in the pre- and post-
                                                 
30 Here it is important to clarify two technical issues: 
First, despite it being reasonable to consider that some other right-hand side variables like, for 
example, physical and human capital and population growth, can be considered endogenous because they 
can be determined simultaneously with the rate of growth (Caselli et al., 1996), practical and technical 
reasons inherent to the finite sample used in this work impede us from proceeding in that way. When 
those variables are treated as potentially endogenous in the estimation, we end up with a problem of too 
many instruments in comparison with the number of observations. Although this fact does not bias the 
coefficient estimates – indeed, treating those variables as endogenous does not affect greatly the 
coefficient estimates or their statistical significance in this work (results not reported) – it increases the 
distance of the feasible efficient GMM estimator from the asymptotic ideal and weakens the Hansen test 
to a point it generates unreliable p-values of 1.000 (Roodman, 2006). Therefore, the solution to reduce the 
number of instruments and solve this problem was to consider those right-hand side variables as 
exogenous. In fact, Ederveen et al. (2006) also consider them as exogenous in a growth specification to 
study the impact of structural funds in a group of 13 EU countries. 
Second, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001) argue that in finite samples the 
asymptotic standard errors from a two-step GMM estimator can be biased and unreliable for inference. 
Therefore, the choice was to present the results from the one-step GMM estimators, with robust standard 
errors to heteroscedasticity, which seem to be more reliable for finite sample inference. 
31 The SYS-GMM estimates indicate a speed of convergence of about 7% to 9%. These estimates are very 
similar to the ones obtained with the PMG estimator for yearly-time spans. They are also close to the 
GMM estimates obtained by Ederveen et al. (2006) in a growth study for 13 EU countries. Caselli et al. 
(1996) also find a high rate of convergence (10% per year) in their study, which they conclude is an 
indication that countries are very near to their steady states and consequently the important differences in 
output per capita across countries will be explained by differences in their steady-states. 
32 This result is in line with the one obtained when annual data was used. The value of 0.86 was computed 
dividing the estimated coefficient on d96eu by 5. In fact, as here the dependent variable represents the 
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Maastricht periods.33 Therefore, these results strengthen the conclusion that EU 
economic growth was not negatively affected by the imposition of fiscal rules in this 
period. 
As the coefficients associated with the additional explanatory variables are not 
significant, a simple basic growth model was considered in the regression presented in 
column 5. Despite the evidence of a slightly lower speed of convergence, the main 
conclusions of this paper are not affected. In regression 6, an additional variable to 
control directly for the deficit rule (def_rule) was included. This variable is a dummy 
that takes value 1 when the average deficit over each five-year time interval is lower 
than 3% of GDP. Results show that high deficits are not synonymous of higher growth, 
giving some additional support to the 3% rule for the budget deficit. 
As a final robustness check of the results obtained so far, column 7 reports the 
results obtained by a simple two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS), where the log of 
the initial output per capita is instrumented with its second lag. As the sample size is not 
large, reasonable results are expected from this estimator. Indeed, the main findings are 
not substantially different from the ones obtained with the other estimators. 
In sum, the results obtained using five-year time spans corroborate the main 
conclusion of the yearly-time spans analysis: growth of real GDP per capita in the EU 
was not negatively affected in the period after Maastricht, i.e. in the period in which 
fiscal rules were imposed over the EU countries. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although some economists claiming that the SGP fiscal rules may have affected 
EU growth negatively, others argue that those rules are necessary to promote fiscal 
consolidation and economic stability in the EMU which will be beneficial for growth in 
the long-run. Nevertheless, very little empirical work has been done to clarify this 
debate. The work presented in this paper intends to find a clear empirical answer to this 
issue and, in doing so, tries to contribute to the literature with some improvements 
                                                                                                                                               
growth over each five-year period, we just need to divide the coefficients by 5 to get the annual impacts 
on growth. This is the same as estimating the same regressions using Δlngdppc/5 as dependent variable. 
33 The margin of manoeuvre was also included in the GMM estimations, instead of the dummies (results 
are not reported here). However, as in the case of the FE estimations, its coefficient was never statistically 
significant. This result can be interpreted as evidence that the eventual constraints imposed by the fiscal 
rules over fiscal policy after Maastricht did not affect growth either positively or negatively. 
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relative to previous empirical works like: using a different method of estimation (pooled 
mean group estimation), a dummy for the period in which fiscal rules started to be 
officially assessed, a margin of manoeuvre indicator and providing a cross-comparison 
between EU and non-EU countries. 
Considering those improvements and using a specific growth equation for both 
yearly and five-year time spans, this study shows that growth was not negatively 
affected in the period after Maastricht in the EU. This is true either comparing recent 
performance of EU countries with their past performance or with the performance of 
other developed countries. Therefore, this paper concludes that Maastricht and SGP 
fiscal rules should not be blamed for harming growth of real GDP per capita in the EU 
area. On the contrary, evidence reveals that, on average, growth is statistically higher in 
the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially 
assessed. Furthermore, this study also presents some evidence favouring the EU fiscal 
rules for the public deficit and debt. 
Even though the results presented in this paper show that EU fiscal rules may 
not have affected growth in Europe in the post-Maastricht period, evidence from the 
annual analysis also indicates that an increase in government investment has a positive 
and significant impact on real output per capita. Therefore, EU authorities should give 
special attention to the potential benefits of productive public investment when 
assessing whether an excessive deficit exists. Otherwise, some countries could find it 
easier to cut public investment than current expenditures in ‘bad’ times to accomplish 
the 3% for the deficit – behaviour which, according to the findings of this paper would 
be prejudicial for output growth. Nevertheless, the results also show that the efforts to 
reduce current expenditures must not be relaxed, especially in the countries that have 
been breaking the rule for the deficit in recent years. 
Finally, it would be interesting to extend the analysis of this paper to the 
countries that have recently joined to the EU. The study of the impact of the fiscal 
constraints and institutional changes that they have to face to control their public 
accounts and to enhance the credibility of their institutions may possibly bring some 
additional insights to the understanding of the impact of those constraints on their 
economic performance. One obstacle to do that study may come from the lack of data 
for the decades of 1970s and 1980s for some of those countries. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Growth of real GDP in the EU and in other OECD countries, 1971-2005 
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Source: OECD (2006). Statistical Compendium. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Description of the Variables Used 
Dependent variable: 
Δlngdppc – growth rate of real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years old at price levels and purchasing 
power parities (PPP) of 2000. 
Convergence variable: 
lngdppct-1 – lagged real GDP per capita of population aged 15-64 years at price levels and PPP of 2000. 
Basic economic growth explanatory variables: 
lnpfcf – the logarithm of the ratio of the real private fixed capital formation to real GDP is used as a proxy for the 
propensity to accumulate physical capital. 
lnhk – the stock of human capital is proxied by the logarithm of the average number of years of schooling of the 
(working-age) population from 25 to 64 years of age. 
ln(n+g+d) – represents the log of population growth (of population aged 15-64) plus the constant g+d to which is 
assigned the value of 0.05 as in Mankiw et al. (1992). 
Exogenous economic policy variables: 
lngvfcf – the log of the ratio of government (gross) fixed capital formation to GDP (both at market or current 
prices) is used as proxy for government investment. 
lngvcns – represents the log of government final consumption expenditure divided by GDP (both at market or 
current prices). 
lngvtxr – log of the ratio of direct to indirect government tax revenues (both at market or current prices). 
sdinfl – inflation volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the rate of growth in the consumer price index 
(CPI) computed as a centred three year moving average. 
lnxmr – the log of the ratio of exports to imports (both at 2000 prices) is a proxy for gains from trade. 
Qualitative variables to control for the period of EU fiscal rules: 
d92eu – dummy that takes value 1 for EU countries for the period 1992-2005 and 0 otherwise. 
d97eu – dummy that takes value 1 for EU countries for the period 1997-2005 and 0 otherwise. 
mg_mnvr – indicator for the margin of manoeuvre of fiscal policy defined according to the SGP rules: before 
Maastricht it is assumed that EU countries have total margin of manoeuvre over fiscal policy => 
mg_mnvr.=1; after Maastricht the margin of manoeuvre will be computed as follows: 
mg_mnvr = (GBS+3)/3                              if GDP growth>-0.75% and -3%<GBS<0% 
= 1                                              if GDP growth < -2% or GBS > 0%; 
= 0.5                                           if -2% < GDP growth < -0.75% and GBS < -3%; 
= 0.5*1+0.5*(GBS+3)/3            if -2% < GDP <-0.75% and -3% < GBS <0%; 
= 0                                              if growth GDP>-0.75% and GBS<-3%; 
GBS means government budget surplus and 0.5 represents the probability of the deficit not being 
considered ‘excessive’ by the European Commission in a situation of moderate recession. 
Sources: OECD Statistical Compendium, April 2006 (for all variables except human capital). 
Data for human capital from 1970 to 1990 was interpolated from five-year observations from De la Fuente and 
Domenéch (2000). For the period 1996 to 2004 data were obtained from OECD Education at a Glance, various 
issues (1998 to 2006). Missing observations were filled by linear interpolation. 
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Table 2. Panel unit root and cointegration tests 
Panel unit root tests Level 1st diff.   Pedroni panel cointegration tests 
lngdppc 
lnpfcf 
lnhk 
ln(n+g+d) 
lngvfcf 
lngvcns 
lngvtxr 
sdinfl 
lnxmr 
-1.43 
-1.93 
-0.38 
-2.34 
-1.39 
-1.80 
-1.71 
-3.32 
-1.92 
-3.57 
-4.39 
-3.58 
-4.88 
-4.15 
-4.05 
-4.29 
-5.56 
-4.22 
  Panel υ –statistic 
Panel rho-statistic 
Panel pp-statistic 
Panel ADF-statistic 
Group rho-statistic 
Group pp-statistic 
Group ADF-statistic 
 
 4.54 
 2.28 
-2.69 
-1.85 
 3.67 
-1.99 
-0.71 
Notes: In the panel unit root tests the critical values for 1%, 5% and 10% are -2.04, -1.90, and -1.81, respectively; for 
example, a k<-1.90 implies rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root or non-stationarity at 5%. Results and 
critical values for these tests were obtained by using the ‘ipshin’ command in STATA. 
Pedroni tests were performed by using a procedure written by Peter Pedroni for RATS; all reported values for 
Pedroni statistics are distributed N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration and those statistics are one-
sided tests with a critical value of -1.64 for a level of significance of 5% (k<-1.64 implies rejection of the null), 
except the υ-statistic that has a critical value 1.64 (k>1.64 means rejection of the null hypothesis). 
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Table 3. Results from dynamic fixed effects panel data estimations 
Dep.: Δlngdppcit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lngdppcit-1 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.0346 
(-2.99)*** 
[0.035] 
19.7 years 
-0.0375 
(-3.33)*** 
[0.038] 
18.1 years 
-0.0350 
(-3.12)*** 
[0.036] 
19.4 years 
-0.0352 
(-4.53)*** 
[0.036] 
19.3 years 
-0.0590 
(-3.71)*** 
[0.061] 
11.4 years 
-0.0275 
(-2.06)** 
[0.028] 
24.9 years 
-0.0697 
(-4.39)*** 
[0.072] 
9.6 years 
lnpfcfit 0.8103 
(2.57)** 
0.6537 
(2.40)** 
0.7960 
(2.60)*** 
0.5073 
(2.31)** 
0.8021 
(2.19)** 
0.1897 
(0.41) 
0.4055 
(1.42) 
lnhkit 1.662 
(3.85)*** 
1.1573 
(3.65)*** 
1.6359 
(5.22)*** 
1.1010 
(3.99)*** 
1.1815 
(3.08)*** 
0.4656 
(0.88) 
0.8096 
(2.54)** 
ln(nit+g+d) -1.589 
(-2.35)** 
-1.4384 
(-2.56)** 
-1.5892 
(-2.46)** 
-1.7553 
(-3.86)*** 
-1.4018 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.2449 
(-0.41) 
-1.1757 
(-3.45)*** 
lngvfcfit-1 0.3694 
(2.19)** 
0.3616 
(2.40)** 
0.3550 
(2.21)** 
0.3203 
(2.66)*** 
0.1027 
(1.18) 
0.1935 
(0.91) 
0.1508 
(1.94)* 
lngvcnsit-1 -2.411 
(-2.80)*** 
-2.164 
(-3.06)*** 
-2.366 
(-2.97)*** 
-2.0996 
(-4.11)*** 
-0.9888 
(-2.65)*** 
-0.6251 
(-1.20) 
-0.9780 
(-3.17)*** 
lngvtxrit-1 0.1270 
(0.68) 
0.1137 
(0.67) 
0.1286 
(0.70) 
-0.0352 
(-0.26) 
-0.0193 
(-0.16) 
0.2387 
(1.08) 
0.0263 
(0.27) 
sdinflit-1 -0.0577 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0581 
(-2.18)** 
-0.0577 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0514 
(-2.33)** 
-0.0681 
(-1.99)** 
-0.0581 
(-0.36) 
-0.0658 
(-2.41)** 
lnxmrit-1 0.8044 
(2.42)** 
0.7181 
(2.45)** 
0.7800 
(2.48)** 
0.5004 
(2.26)** 
0.4101 
(1.29) 
0.6157 
(1.45) 
0.1462 
(0.57) 
d92euit -0.0007 
(-0.25) 
   0.0039 
(0.61) 
  
d97euit  0.0054 
(2.22)** 
 0.0060 
(2.98)*** 
 0.0112 
(1.97)** 
0.0093 
(3.72)*** 
mg_mnvrit-1   0.0012 
(0.52) 
    
Δlnpfcfit 0.1045 
(5.52)*** 
0.1047 
(5.59)*** 
0.1050 
(5.54)*** 
0.1025 
(7.12)*** 
0.1106 
(4.42)*** 
0.1171 
(3.77)*** 
0.1143 
(4.77)*** 
Δlnhkit -0.0509 
(-0.81) 
-0.0250 
(-0.40) 
-0.0541 
(-0.87) 
0.0264 
(0.49) 
-0.0784 
(-1.42) 
0.0005 
(0.01) 
-0.0668 
(-1.23) 
Δln(nit+g+d) 0.0116 
(0.94) 
0.0104 
(0.83) 
0.0120 
(0.96) 
0.0099 
(1.00) 
0.0155 
(1.36) 
-0.0200 
(-1.85)* 
0.0154 
(1.37) 
Δlngvfcfit 0.0364 
(3.72)*** 
0.0372 
(3.81)*** 
0.0361 
(3.67)*** 
0.0354 
(4.28)*** 
0.0341 
(3.40)*** 
0.0357 
(2.68)*** 
0.0354 
(3.56)*** 
Δlngvcnsit -0.2585 
(-8.08)*** 
-0.2593 
(-8.12)*** 
-0.2586 
(-8.09)*** 
-0.2618 
(-10.32)*** 
-0.1841 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.1904 
(-4.69)*** 
-0.1850 
(-5.54)*** 
Δlngvtxrit 0.0258 
(2.20)** 
0.0252 
(2.14)** 
0.0260 
(2.22)** 
0.0141 
(1.49) 
0.0145 
(1.37) 
0.0288 
(1.97)** 
0.0177 
(1.72) 
Δsdinflit 0.0001 
(0.11) 
-0.0001 
(-0.03) 
0.0001 
(0.10) 
-0.0003 
(-0.35) 
-0.0022 
(-1.12) 
0.0014 
(0.36) 
-0.0021 
(-1.09) 
Δlnxmrit -0.0118 
(-0.52) 
-0.0139 
(-0.62) 
-0.0117 
(-0.52) 
-0.0154 
(-1.06) 
0.0342 
(1.29) 
0.0500 
(1.40) 
0.0286 
(1.13) 
constant 0.0489 
(0.40) 
0.1134 
(1.00) 
0.0511 
(0.47) 
0.0652 
(0.89) 
0.2382 
(1.40) 
0.2504 
(1.74)* 
0.3505 
(2.09)** 
R2 0.5873 0.5913 0.5875 0.5634 0.5946 0.5030 0.6133 
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1992-2004 1997-2004 1992-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 21 21 21 21 
No. observations 448 448 448 641 273 168 273 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; the 
estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ) is in square brackets; models estimated controlling for fixed effects (see 
text for reasons why fixed effects make more sense in this context; Hausman tests also rejected random effects, nevertheless, 
equation in column 6 was estimated by random effects because the dummy d97eu was dropped in the fixed effects estimation 
due to lack of variability). In all estimations the presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation was 
controlled for by using robust standard errors. The long-run coefficients, their respective standard errors and t-statistics were 
estimated according to the relation θs=asi/фi. 
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a)  hwtc means half way to convergence and measures the time it takes to go half way to the new steady-state output per capita or 
the time it takes to reduce half of the differences in output per capita among countries. 
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Table 4. Pooled mean group panel data estimations and robustness analysis 
Dep.: Δlngdppcit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
lngdppcit-1 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.0700 
(-6.72)*** 
[0.073] 
9.6 years 
-0.0643 
(-7.59)*** 
[0.066] 
10.4 years 
-0.0594 
(-7.87)*** 
[0.061] 
11.3 years 
-0.1726 
(-5.51)*** 
[0.1894] 
3.7 years 
-0.0377 
(-2.14)** 
[0.0384] 
18.0 years 
-0.0871 
(-3.28)*** 
[0.0911] 
7.6 years 
-0.0886 
(-1.35) 
[0.0928] 
7.5 years 
lnpfcfit 0.5451 
(4.21)*** 
0.3551 
(3.09)*** 
0.4937 
(3.87)*** 
0.4745 
(4.48)*** 
0.5679 
(1.67)* 
1.1965 
(2.40)** 
0.2398 
(0.30) 
lnhkit 1.2879 
(7.78)*** 
0.8142 
(3.89)*** 
1.4183 
(10.27)*** 
-0.0131 
(-0.07) 
0.8971 
(1.78)* 
-0.7826 
(-0.96) 
2.3633 
(1.59) 
ln(nit+g+d) -0.9556 
(-5.28)*** 
-1.0070 
(-4.52)*** 
-0.9183 
(-3.99)*** 
-0.4429 
(-4.78)*** 
-1.8416 
(-1.89)* 
-0.5974 
(-2.31)** 
-1.4288 
(-1.10) 
lngvfcfit-1 0.1770 
(3.14)*** 
0.2672 
(3.01)*** 
0.2120 
(3.21)*** 
0.1089 
(3.21)*** 
0.2812 
(1.29) 
0.1041 
(0.83) 
0.0407 
(0.18) 
lngvcnsit-1 -1.5428 
(-5.42)*** 
-1.5558 
(-4.36)*** 
-1.8797 
(-5.23)*** 
-0.3853 
(-2.42)** 
-1.9274 
(-1.75)* 
-0.1352 
(-0.35) 
-1.6997 
(-1.15) 
lngvtxrit-1 0.0077 
(0.10) 
-0.0428 
(-0.43) 
0.0925 
(1.12) 
0.0187 
(0.42) 
-0.2074 
(-0.86) 
-0.0357 
(-0.22) 
-0.3744 
(-1.03) 
sdinflit-1 -0.0421 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.0547 
(-4.34)*** 
-0.0480 
(-3.48)*** 
-0.0131 
(-0.74) 
-0.0507 
(-1.63) 
-0.0358 
(-0.78) 
-0.0531 
(-0.68) 
lnxmrit-1 0.1948 
(1.41) 
0.4043 
(3.17)*** 
0.3992 
(3.09)*** 
0.1634 
(1.51) 
0.7463 
(1.73)* 
0.3146 
(0.78) 
0.3369 
(0.70) 
d92euit -0.0010 
(0.29) 
      
d97euit  0.0087 
(4.06)*** 
 0.0101 
(5.38)*** 
   
Mg_mnvrit-1   0.0012 
(0.42) 
    
R2     0.5953 0.7355 0.6172 
Log-likelihood 1472.3 1469.9 1464.2     
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1997-2004 1972-1996 1997-2004 1997-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 21 14 14 7 
No. observations 448 448 448 168 336 112 56 
lngdppcit-1 (b)    -0.1946 
(-2.40)** 
-0.0593 
(-2.32)** 
-0.0611 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.0592 
(-1.71)* 
d92euit (b)    0.0068 
(0.87) 
   
Time period    1992-2004 1972-1991 1992-2004 1992-2004 
No. observations    252 266 182 91 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: All equations were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant, but due to space limitations only long-run and 
dummy coefficients are reported. PMG estimations are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3; Arellano-Bond techniques are used to 
estimate model 4; and a fixed effects estimator is used to estimate models in columns 5, 6 and 7. Robust standard errors are 
used to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. t-statistics are in parentheses (z-statistics for the PMG and Arellano-
Bond estimations); significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%.; again, the speed 
of convergence (λ) is in square brackets. 
Luxembourg and Iceland were excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a) See Table 3. 
(b) In these lines the convergence coefficient and the coefficient on the dummy d92eu (when included in the model, instead of 
d97eu) are presented and result from a similar specification to the one above but using another time period or threshold; the 
coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis I 
Δlngdppcit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
lngdppcit-1 -0.0623 
(-6.99)*** 
-0.0657 
(-9.24)*** 
-0.0678 
(-9.40)*** 
-0.1062 
(-6.88)*** 
-0.0538 
(-7.48)*** 
-0.0593 
(-7.02)*** 
-0.0884 
(-7.19)*** 
-0.0722 
(-7.37)*** 
lnpfcfit 0.4559 
(3.32)*** 
0.5297 
(3.74)*** 
0.4361 
(3.22)*** 
0.4521 
(6.91)*** 
0.4669 
(3.10)*** 
0.6222 
(4.03)*** 
0.4498 
(5.90)*** 
0.4250 
(3.33)*** 
lnhkit 1.2519 
(7.10)*** 
1.0804 
(5.22)*** 
1.5567 
(8.70)*** 
0.8579 
(14.58)*** 
1.7914 
(6.44)*** 
1.4134 
(7.61)*** 
1.2592 
(11.21)*** 
0.9969 
(5.85)*** 
ln(nit+g+d) -0.9477 
(-5.11)*** 
-0.4132 
(-2.84)*** 
-1.1205 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.6763 
(-5.26)*** 
-0.8816 
(-3.52)*** 
-1.0763 
(-4.70)*** 
-1.1358 
(-6.77)*** 
-0.8216 
(-4.19)*** 
lngvfcfit-1 0.2112 
(3.26)*** 
0.2971 
(3.43)*** 
0.1815 
(3.20)*** 
 0.2110 
(2.36)** 
0.1668 
(2.64)*** 
0.2133 
(5.57)*** 
0.2802 
(3.35)*** 
lngvcnsit-1 -1.9465 
(-3.12)*** 
-1.6298 
(-4.33)*** 
-1.5047 
(-4.94)*** 
 -1.2972 
(-3.60)*** 
-1.5463 
(-4.71)*** 
-1.4404 
(-7.21)*** 
-1.0231 
(-4.58)*** 
lngvtxrit-1  0.2615 
(3.07)*** 
  0.1679 
(1.57) 
0.0763 
(0.91) 
0.0187 
(0.28) 
-0.0131 
(-0.17) 
lngvrcpit-1 0.0915 
(0.37) 
       
sdinflit-1 -0.0509 
(-3.68)*** 
   -0.0505 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.0378 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0380 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.0399 
(-3.57)*** 
inflit-1  -0.0314 
(-4.12)*** 
      
lnxmrit-1 0.0482 
(0.29) 
0.4305 
(2.84)*** 
0.1882 
(1.36) 
 0.6289 
(2.84)*** 
0.1389 
(0.97) 
0.1687 
(2.43)** 
0.2443 
(2.03)** 
lnoilpit-1     -0.2046 
(-2.86)*** 
   
gwgdpit      0.3411 
(7.15)*** 
  
devtrit-1       -0.0040 
(-1.74)* 
 
debtit-1        0.0001 
(0.03) 
d92euit -0.0002 
(-0.04) 
-0.0035 
(-1.24) 
0.0001 
(0.02) 
0.0054 
(1.18) 
-0.0070 
(-2.36)** 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.0011 
(0.32) 
lngdppcit-1 (a) -0.0460 
(-8.11)*** 
-0.0427 
(-8.23)*** 
-0.0450 
(-11.13)***
-0.0841 
(-5.93)*** 
-0.0595 
(-6.57)*** 
-0.0582 
(-7.80)*** 
-0.0746 
(-6.62)*** 
-0.0732 
(-6.20)*** 
lnoilpit-1 (a)     -0.1716 
(-3.66)*** 
   
gwgdpit (a)      0.3481 
(6.15)*** 
  
devtrit-1 (a)       0.0038 
(-1.31) 
 
debtit-1 (a)        0.0001 
(0.05) 
d97euit  (a) 0.0080 
(2.90)*** 
0.0078 
(3.98)*** 
0.0062 
(2.54)** 
0.0110 
(3.36)*** 
0.0090 
(3.41)*** 
0.0065 
(3.45)*** 
0.0102 
(4.13)*** 
0.0076 
(2.77)*** 
Time period 1972-2004 1971-2004 1971-2004 1971-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
No. Obs. 448 462 462 462 448 448 411 439 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: All equations were estimated including short-run dynamics and a constant, but only long-run and dummy coefficients are 
reported; a PMG estimator is used to estimate the models; z-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
Luxembourg is excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a) In these lines only the convergence coefficient, the control variables and the coefficient on the dummy d97eu (when included 
in the model, instead of d92eu) are presented and come from a similar specification to the one above; the coefficients on the 
other exogenous variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity analysis II 
Δlngdppcit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
lngdppcit-1 -0.0629 
(-6.35)*** 
-0.0959 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.0810 
(-7.51)*** 
-0.0625 
(-7.38)*** 
-0.0665 
(-7.36)*** 
-0.1004 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.0599 
(-2.57)*** 
-0.0997 
(-2.10)** 
lnpfcfit 0.4578 
(3.31)*** 
0.2218 
(1.73)* 
0.3771 
(3.12)*** 
0.4537 
(3.70)*** 
0.4380 
(3.86)*** 
0.3967 
(3.46)*** 
1.0348 
(4.65)*** 
0.5205 
(5.52)*** 
lnhkit 1.2262 
(6.94)*** 
0.9069 
(10.42)*** 
1.3549 
(8.22)*** 
1.4433 
(10.72)*** 
1.4600 
(11.49)*** 
1.3724 
(5.08)*** 
0.7508 
(4.68)*** 
0.5444 
(3.73)*** 
ln(nit+g+d) -1.0391 
(-5.06)*** 
-0.9707 
(-6.25)*** 
-0.9518 
(-5.38)*** 
-0.9324 
(-4.26)*** 
-0.8825 
(-4.40)*** 
-0.8830 
(-3.93)*** 
-1.0884 
(-3.96)*** 
-0.2041 
(-1.86)* 
lngvfcfit-1 0.2432 
(3.91)*** 
 0.2152 
(3.77)*** 
0.2188 
(3.31)*** 
0.2215 
(3.53)*** 
0.1978 
(1.85)* 
0.1756 
(2.60)*** 
 
lngvcnsit-1 -0.8947 
(-3.95)*** 
 -1.2463 
(-5.35)*** 
-1.8386 
(-5.59)*** 
-1.7376 
(-5.91)*** 
-1.5269 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.0477 
(-0.29) 
 
lngvtxrit-1 -0.1172 
(-1.35) 
 -0.0688 
(-0.88) 
0.1085 
(1.33) 
0.0770 
(0.98) 
   
sdinflit-1 -0.0296 
(-2.36)** 
-0.0162 
(-2.23)** 
-0.0395 
(-3.72)*** 
-0.0499 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.0480 
(-4.03)*** 
-0.0433 
(-3.67)*** 
0.0201 
(1.43) 
 
lnxmrit-1 0.1852 
(1.42) 
0.0332 
(0.46) 
0.2802 
(2.12)** 
0.4169 
(3.31)*** 
0.3948 
(3.40)*** 
0.5277 
(2.75)*** 
0.2429 
(1.89)* 
 
Δdebtit-1 -0.0208 
(-4.09)*** 
       
gbsit-1  0.0239 
(5.11)*** 
      
def_ruleit-1   0.0039 
(2.65)*** 
     
d92euit -0.0005 
(-0.13) 
-0.0014 
(-0.25) 
-0.0008 
(-0.21) 
  -0.0075 
(-1.20)) 
0.0023 
(0.37) 
0.0110 
(1.89)* 
mg_mnvrit-1 (b)    0.0031 
(1.02) 
0.0027 
(0.90) 
   
lngdppcit-1 (a) -0.0526 
(-6.17)*** 
-0.0985 
(-5.56)*** 
-0.0765 
(-10.07)***
  -0.0775 
(-4.69)*** 
-0.0555 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.0871 
(-5.27)*** 
Δdebtit-1 (a) -0.0266 
(-3.82)*** 
       
gbsit-1 (a)  0.0192 
(4.90)*** 
      
def_ruleit-1 (a)   0.0065 
(2.41)** 
     
d97euit (a) 0.0053 
(2.11)** 
0.0044 
(0.84) 
0.0097 
(2.97)*** 
  0.0096 
(2.06)** 
0.0098 
(3.52)*** 
0.0045 
(0.66) 
Time period 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1972-2004 1971-2004 
No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 6 8 7 
No. Obs. 436 448 448 448 448 192 256 231 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: See Table 5. Regression 6 considers only the sample of the 6 EU countries that have had problems is accomplishing the 3% 
rule for the deficit (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and UK), whilst regression 7 encompasses the other 8 countries; 
column 8 presents the results of a regression including just the non-EU countries. 
(a) In these lines only the results for the convergence coefficient and the coefficients on the debt, deficit and d97eu variables 
(when included in the model, instead of d92eu) are reported and come from a similar specification to the one above; the 
coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
(b) In column 4, the margin of manoeuvre was computed in the same way as before, but the values for the GBS were estimated by 
rolling regressing GBS as a function of time; In column 5, the margin of manoeuvre was computed considering the following 
non-linear relation: mg_mnvr=exp{GBS} if GBS<0 and year>1991; and mg_mnvr=1, otherwise. 
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Table 7. Results from five-year time spans estimations 
Dep.: Δlngdppcit (1) FE (2) FE (3) DIF-GMM (4) SYS-GMM (5) SYS-GMM (6) SYS-GMM (7) 2SLS 
lngdppcit-5 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.3427 
(-5.44)*** 
[0.084] 
8.3 years 
-0.3272 
(-5.15)*** 
[0.079] 
8.7 years 
-0.5334 
(-4.57)*** 
[0.152] 
4.5 years 
-0.3802 
(-3.10)*** 
[0.096] 
7.2 years 
-0.3123 
(-2.96)*** 
[0.075] 
9.3 years 
-0.3311 
(-3.30)*** 
[0.080] 
8.6 years 
-0.2825 
(-3.67)*** 
[0.066] 
10.4 years 
lnpfcfit 0.1935 
(2.91)*** 
0.1972 
(3.08)*** 
0.1204 
(1.10) 
0.1217 
(2.14)** 
0.1028 
(3.10)*** 
0.1421 
(3.13)*** 
0.0859 
(1.94)* 
lnhkit 0.3989 
(3.61)*** 
0.4586 
(6.94)*** 
0.6555 
(3.13)*** 
0.3094 
(2.88)** 
0.2658 
(2.31)** 
0.2494 
(2.20)** 
0.2400 
(3.01)*** 
ln(nit+g+d) -0.2443 
(-4.19)*** 
-0.2822 
(-5.32)*** 
-0.2363 
(-4.76)*** 
-0.2436 
(-5.71)*** 
-0.2296 
(-4.07)*** 
-0.2548 
(-4.61)*** 
-0.2212 
(-2.73)*** 
lngvfcfit 0.0126 
(0.63) 
0.0062 
(0.31) 
-0.0290 
(-2.19)** 
0.0240 
(1.21) 
  0.0462 
(2.10)** 
lngvcnsit -0.3309 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.3429 
(-4.08)*** 
-0.3239 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.0880 
(-0.82) 
  0.1083 
(-1.52) 
lngvtxrit 0.0750 
(2.25)** 
0.0769 
(2.33)** 
0.0874 
(1.57) 
-0.0282 
(-0.81) 
  0.0365 
(1.42) 
sdinflit -0.0110 
(-1.17) 
-0.0112 
(-1.26) 
-0.0111 
(-1.36) 
-0.0100 
(-1.02) 
  -0.0108 
(-0.98) 
lnxmrit 0.1587 
(2.19)** 
0.1362 
(1.84*) 
0.0648 
(0.64) 
0.1689 
(2.06)* 
 0.1734 
(2.34)** 
0.1511 
(1.83)* 
def_ruleit      0.0245 
(2.16)** 
 
d96euit 0.0151 
(0.84) 
 0.0149 
(1.07) 
0.0432 
(3.47)*** 
0.0444 
(2.59)** 
0.0366 
(2.32)** 
0.0369 
(2.05)** 
mg_mnvrit  0.0294 
(1.21) 
     
R2 0.6115 0.6162     0.4418 
Hansen test   0.74 0.90 0.63 0.87  
lngdppcit-5 (b) 
 
Implied λ 
hwtc (a) 
-0.3251 
(-4.96)*** 
[0.079] 
8.8 years 
 -0.4606 
(-4.52)*** 
[0.123] 
5.6 years 
-0.2866 
(-1.76)* 
[0.068] 
10.3 years 
-0.2322 
(-1.81)* 
[0.053] 
13.1 years 
-0.3265 
(-2.50)** 
[0.079] 
8.8 years 
-0.2303 
(-3.13)*** 
[0.052] 
13.2 years 
def_ruleit (b)      0.0321 
(3.36)*** 
 
d91euit (b) -0.0141 
(-0.91) 
 -0.0217 
(-1.79)* 
0.0059 
(0.33) 
0.0070 
(0.49) 
0.0216 
(1.35) 
-0.0010 
(-0.05) 
R2 0.6114      0.3986 
Hansen test   0.70 0.92 0.65 0.90  
No. countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
No. time periods 7 7 6 7 7 7 6 
No. observations 98 98 84 98 98 98 84 
Sources: See Table 1. 
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; the 
estimated speed of convergence to the steady-state (λ=[-ln(1-ф)]/5) is in square brackets. In columns 1 and 2 the model is 
estimated controlling for fixed effects. The instruments used for DIF-GMM are the second and third lags of the log of output 
per capita; all other right-hand-side variables are assumed exogenous and are instrumented with their own values; the 
additional instrument used in the SYS-GMM is the difference of the log of output per capita lagged one period. A two-stage 
least squares estimator is used to obtain the results presented in the column 7 (here the log of initial output per capita is 
instrumented with its second lag). The presence of any pattern of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation is controlled for by 
using robust standard errors. The values reported for the Hansen test are the p-values for the null hypothesis of a valid 
specification. Luxembourg was excluded from the sample due to lack of observations for human capital. 
(a) See Table 3. 
(b) These results come from a similar specification to the one reported above in the same column but including the variable d92eu 
instead of d97eu; the coefficients on the other exogenous variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
 
